The administration is trotting out a shiny new narrative on Iraq: Petraus's Anbar Awakening has brought around the Sunni Tribes, who are now our allies in a battle against the wicked excesses of Al Qaeda in Iraq.
But what if everything we've heard about AQI is as overblown as the original scare-stories about Saddam's WMD?
Andrew Tilghman, a former Iraq correspondent for the Stars and Stripes newspaper, has an article that just hit the
Washington monthly that takes an in-depth look at just how big a movement AQI really is – and the answer isn’t pretty. Particularly since the Anbar Awakening strategy is based around arming Sunnis to fight AQI, it’s pretty important to know just how much AQI there is... and what we’re really arming those tribal leaders for. If AQI is "is a microscopic terrorist organization," then what will the Sunnis do with all those guns?
Never mind the fog of war... Never mind the
incredible moving casualty figures... This is midnight in the coal mine, and we really have no clue about what’s going on here...
(More...)
Tilghman notes that "In July... the president gave a speech about Iraq that mentioned al-Qaeda ninety-five times." So what's the real scoop? The biggest claim by the military is that AQI is around 15% of the insurgency, but after looking at all the evidence....The most persuasive estimate I've heard comes from Malcolm Nance, the author of The Terrorists of Iraq and a twenty-year intelligence veteran and Arabic speaker who has worked with military and intelligence units tracking al-Qaeda inside Iraq. He believes AQI includes about 850 full-time fighters, comprising 2 percent to 5 percent of the Sunni insurgency. "Al-Qaeda in Iraq," according to Nance, "is a microscopic terrorist organization."
One gauge of responsibility is the claims AQI itself makes on its various websites. They're hardly shy:AQI took credit for 10 percent of attacks on Iraqi security forces and Shiite militias (forty-three out of 439 attacks), and less than 4 percent of attacks on U.S. troops (seventeen out of 357).
Okay, so maybe they don't have a high percentage of the total attacks. But what about the spectacular attacks? The admin has been quick to blame AQI for such huge, destructive bombings as those in Samara or Tal Afar. But according to Tilghman, the pattern has been to step in and blame AQI, even though the evidence is either scanty, or points in other directions:...it remains unclear whether the original Samara bombing was itself the work of AQI. The group never took credit for the attack... The man who the military believe orchestrated the bombing, an Iraqi named Haitham al-Badri, was both a Samara native and a former high-ranking government official under Saddam Hussein... Samara was the heart of Saddam's power base, where former regime fighters keep tight control over the insurgency.
Same with Tal Afar. The administration blamed that on AQI, but when arrests were made:...when the U.S. military issued a press release about the arrests, there was no mention of an al-Qaeda connection. The suspects were never formally charged, and nearly six months later neither the U.S. military nor Iraqi police are certain of the source of the attacks. In recent public statements, the military has backed off its former allegations that al-Qaeda was responsible, instead asserting... that "the tactics used in this attack are consistent with al-Qaeda."
Everyone has an interest in promoting the Al Qaeda myth: The Shiite government can avoid looking incompetent in the face of Sunni attacks by blaming the AQI bogeyman; Sunnis can claim "it’s not us, it’s AQI"; reporters hoping for page 1 stories are inclined to hype AQI, since it's easier to report than a confusing, muddled "sectarian violence" narrative; and of course there’s Bush.This scenario has become common. After a strike, the military rushes to point the finger at al-Qaeda, even when the actual evidence remains hazy and an alternative explanation—raw hatred between local Sunnis and Shiites—might fit the circumstances just as well. The press blasts such dubious conclusions back to American citizens and policy makers in Washington, and the incidents get tallied and quantified in official reports, cited by the military in briefings in Baghdad. The White House then takes the reports and crafts sound bites depicting AQI as the number one threat to peace and stability in Iraq.
So what does all this mean?
We're watching the meme-shifting in Washington, from the failure of the benchmarks to the amazing success of Petraus's brilliant gambit - win over the Sunnis to the war on Al Qaeda! Look, the surge is working!
But if AQI is a rump movement, we're watching yet another short-term fix that will screw us in the long term.
Consider the track record:
* Our ally is the Maliki government. But he was put in power by the Sadrists.
* The Sadrists are our enemy. Why? They want US troop out. We spent more than a year at war with one of the government’s biggest supports.
* We’re also at war with the other side: the Sunni insurgency.
* Next, we declare rhetorical war on the Iranians and their allies. That’s the other half of the government. Smooth move.
* That leaves us with just the Kurds - and our allies the Turks are practically at war with them. Smooth move.
* Fast forward to this year and the Anbar Awakening, in which we arm the Sunni tribal leaders in Anbar, the same Sunni leaders who were our enemies not long ago... So we're fighting our friends, and arming our enemies. Smooooth move.
While the U.S. military has recently touted "news" that Sunni insurgents have turned against the al-Qaeda terrorists in Anbar Province, there is little evidence of actual clashes between these two groups. Sunni insurgents in Anbar have largely ceased attacks on Americans, but some observers suggest that this development has less to do with vanquishing AQI than with the fact that U.S. troops now routinely deliver cash-filled duffle bags to tribal sheiks serving as "lead contractors" on "reconstruction projects."
So we’re attempting to defuse a civil war... by arming and training the fighters on the anti-government side. Smooth move.
At least they’re going after AQI, right? But if Tilghman is right, there isn’t much AQI for them to go after. 850 fighters? That seems like a good deal for the Sunnis – "Sure, help us arm and train a force of thousands, and we’ll go after this annoying upstart runt of a movement for you. And when we’re done... well, we’ll see."
Truly smooth move on their part.
But this leaves just one more question:
If the Kurds are our allies, and the Shiites are our allies (the Sadrists have sensibly ordered their fighters to stand down until after the surge), and now the Sunnis are our allies, and AQI is actually a tiny faction – just who the hell have we been fighting? And where are all these casualties coming from?
And how the hell do we ‘win’ on a battlefield as incoherent as this? Michael Zacchea, a lieutenant colonel in the Marine Reserves who was deployed to Iraq, said he was sometimes skeptical of upper-level analysis emphasizing al-Qaeda in Iraq rather than the insurgency's local roots. "It's very, very frustrating for everyone involved who is trying to do the right thing," he said. "That's not how anyone learned to play the game when we were officers coming up the ranks, and we were taught to provide clear battlefield analysis."